
Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease

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Migration is increasingly interpreted as a security problem. The prism of security analysis is especially important for politicians, for national and local police organizations, the military police, customs officers, border patrols, secret services, armies, judges, some social services (health care, hospitals, schools), private corporations (bank analysts, providers of technology surveillance, private policing), many journalists (especially from television and the more sensationalist newspapers), and a significant fraction of general public opinion, especially but not only among those attracted to “law and order.” The popularity of this security prism is not an expression of traditional responses to a rise of insecurity, crime, terrorism, and the negative effects of globalization; it is the result of the creation of a continuum of threats and general unease in which many different actors exchange their fears and beliefs in the process of making a risky and dangerous society. The professionals in charge of the management of risk and fear especially transfer the legitimacy they gain from struggles against terrorists, criminals, spies, and counterfeiters toward other targets, most notably transnational political activists, people crossing borders, or people born in the country but with foreign parents.

This expansion of what security is taken to include effectively results in a convergence between the meaning of international and internal security. The convergence is particularly important in relation to the issue of migration, and specifically in relation to questions about who gets to be defined as an immigrant. The security professionals themselves, along with some academics, tend to claim that they are only responding to new threats requiring exceptional

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measures beyond the normal demands of everyday politics. In practice, however, the transformation of security and the consequent focus on immigrants is directly related to their own immediate interests (competition for budgets and missions) and to the transformation of technologies they use (computerized databanks, profiling and morphing, electronic phone tapping). The Europeanization and the Westernization of the logics of control and surveillance of people beyond national polices is driven by the creation of a transnational field of professionals in the management of unease. This field is larger than that of police organizations in that it includes, on one hand private corporations and organizations dealing with the control of access to the welfare state, and, on the other hand, intelligence services and some military people seeking a new role after the end of the Cold War. These professionals in the management of unease, however, are only a node connecting many competing networks responding to many groups of people who are identified as risk or just as a source of unease.¹

This process of securitization is now well known, but despite the many critical discourses that have drawn attention to the securitization of migration over the past ten years, the articulation of migration as a security problem continues. Why? What are the reasons of the persistent framing of migration in relation to terrorism, crime, unemployment and religious zealotry, on the one hand, and to integration, interest of the migrant for the national economy development, on the other, rather than in relation to new opportunities for European societies, for freedom of travel over the world, for cosmopolitanism, or for some new understanding of citizenship?² This is the question I want to address in this essay.

Some "critical" discourses generated by NGOs and academics assume that if people, politicians, governments, bureaucracies, and journalists were more aware, they would change their minds about migration and begin to resist securitizing it. The primary problem, therefore, is ideological or discursive in that the securitization of migrants derives from the language itself and from the different capacities of various actors to engage in speech acts. In this context, the term "speech act" is used not in its technical Austinian sense, but metaphorically, to justify both the normative position of a speaker and the value of their critical discourse against the discourses of the security professionals. This understanding of critique reinforces the vision of a contest between ideas and norms, a contest in which academics can play a leading role.³

This essay tries to be critical in a rather different sense. It seeks to avoid presenting the struggle as an ideological one between conservative and liberal positions, or even as an "intertextual competition"

between agencies in which academics have a key role. It examines why the discourses of securitization continue to be so powerful even when alternative discourses are well known, and why the production of academic and alternative discourses has so little effect in either the political arena or in daily life. It emphasizes the work of politicization, of the mobilization of groups and technologies enabling some agents, especially political actors, the media, the security professionals and some sectors of the general population, to create a "truth" about the link between crime, unemployment, and migration, even when academics, churches, NGOs and some social policy-oriented institutions have made powerful claims to the contrary for many years.

My hypothesis is that the securitization of immigration is not only an effect of, even if it contributes to, the propaganda of the far right political parties, the rise of racism, a new and more efficient rhetoric convincing the population of a danger, or successful "speech acts" performed by actors coming from the state or from the society.⁴ Securitization of the immigrant as a risk is based on our conception of the state as a body or a container for the polity. It is anchored in the fears of politicians about losing their symbolic control over the territorial boundaries.⁵ It is structured by the *habitus* of the security professionals and their new interests not only in the foreigner but in the "immigrant." These interests are correlated with the globalization of technologies of surveillance and control going beyond the national borders.⁶ It is based, finally, on the "unease" that some citizens who feel discarded suffer because they cannot cope with the uncertainty of everyday life.⁷ This worry, or unease, is not psychological. It is a structural unease in a "risk society" framed by neoliberal discourses in which freedom is always associated at its limits with danger and (in)security.

The securitization of migration is, thus, a transversal political technology, used as a mode of governmentality by diverse institutions to play with the unease,⁸ or to encourage it if it does not yet exist,⁹ so as to affirm their role as providers of protection and security and to mask some of their failures.¹⁰ The securitization of immigration then emerges from the correlation between some successful speech acts of political leaders, the mobilization they create for and against some groups of people, and the specific field of security professionals (which, in the West, and despite many differences, now tend to unite policemen, gendarmes, intelligence services, military people, providers of technology of surveillance and experts on risk assessments). It comes also from a range of administrative practices such as population profiling, risk assessment, statistical calculation, category creation, proactive preparation, and

what may be termed a specific *habitus* of the “security professional” with its ethos of secrecy and concern for the management of fear or unease.¹¹

The Success of Securitization of Immigration in the Political Realm

For a majority of antiracist and Human Rights associations, as well as for many scholars linked to these associations, the force of the securitization of migration comes from the “spontaneous” spread of intolerance and racist prejudice over large groups of people. The popular classes are “contaminated” by “law and order” visions about foreigners and accept them. Ignorance of the broader stakes combined with a populism calculated to please frustrated people creates a potential for security-oriented behavior against foreigners.¹² This analysis of the susceptibility of populations to populist rhetoric may be accurate in some respects. However, the ineffectiveness of critical discourses is not a consequence of a simple blindness on the part of politicians, the electorate, security professionals, and media.¹³ Success will not come by repeating again and again reasoned argument about how useful foreigners could be for a society. So the refusal to take into account the critical discourses can be characterized not as a lack of knowledge but as a policy of forgetting, or as a denial.¹⁴

As Ayse Ceyhan and Anastasia Tsoukala show in this issue, claims that increases in insecurity can be attributed to the responsibility of migrants for crime, delinquency, and deviance have been successfully challenged by critical analysis without much effect on the prevailing political rhetoric. Analytical accuracy has not really undermined the consensus among political leaders and bureaucracies. It is not directly by arguing for migrants and against securitization that critical discourses can change the situation.¹⁵ Details of the negative effects of government policies or international institutions will not change the situation for immigrants. They will still be framed in relation to statist practices of rejection or integration. Effective challenges can only be indirect, by analyzing the conditions under which the authority of truth is given to a discourse that creates the immigrant as an “outsider, inside the State.”¹⁶

Security and Immigration: Seeing Like a State

Policies of denial, of active forgetting about migration role and status, draw their strength from the way the state is conceived by the

main actors of these discourses of securitization of immigrants.¹⁷ For journalists, bureaucrats, and lawyers, but also for most political scientists of Western societies, *state* is often confused with *state apparatus and government*. Governants in representative democracies, they argue, derive their legitimacy from their citizens, so they associate *state* and *democracy* without much sense of the limits of and contradictions between these two notions. Citizens are then conceived as nationals, understood by opposition to foreigners, and, migrants are framed through various cultural discourses as foreigners, or as citizens of a different national origin, who do not fit the “national standard” of norms and values. So, migration is always understood, through the categories of the national and the state, as a danger to the “homogeneity of the people.” The activation of the term *migrant* in *im-migrant* is by definition seen as something destructive. The metaphor of the body politic embedded in the sovereignty myth—in the need to monitor borders to reassure the integrity of what is “inside,” in the practice of territorial protection, in the technologies of surveillance—creates an image of immigration associated with an outsider coming inside, as a danger to the homogeneity of the state, the society, and the polity.¹⁸

The genealogy of the Western state, in relation to both its strongest myths and its institutionalization, has been analyzed in the sociologies of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens.¹⁹ They have shown how, in Bourdieu’s terms, “states conceptualise us more than we, as academics, conceptualise the State.” The studies in international-relations theory by John Ruggie, Thomas Biersteker, Richard Ashley, and R. B. J. Walker have similarly emphasized the capacity of states to impose themselves as a frame of mind.²⁰ They obliged IR theorists to analyze the territorial dimension of the Westphalian state, a topic that has also been examined by Bertrand Badie, Richard Mansbach, and Martin Heisler.²¹ I will not develop this aspect here: I just want to emphasize that, even if all these concepts were arms in symbolic and political struggles between different groups, the concepts of sovereignty, security, and borders always structure our thought as if there existed a “body”—an “envelope,” or “container”—differentiating one polity from another. The state justifies itself as the only political order possible as soon as it is accepted that sovereignty, law and order, and a single body are the prerequisite for peace and homogeneity. It justifies the “national” identity that the state has achieved through a territorialization of its order, by a cutting up of borders.

The strength of this symbolic order has been analyzed so many times that it is not necessary to expand on the subject, but it is important to remember this way of thinking because too many economists or sociologists working on migration “forget” this political

element. They actively work to forget the central illusion of power as a body, through homogeneity, sovereignty, and law, that prevents an understanding of the global social transformations concerning movement of people and identity politics. Furthermore, politicians, lawyers, and some sociologists can hardly admit that power cannot be analyzed through legitimate and steady forms—that it is not coming from the top and going downward; that, in Michel Foucault's terms, "it cannot be analyzed in its intentions; but on the contrary where it is in direct relationship with its targets, where it moves, where, at its extremities, power goes beyond the Law, where the techniques and tactics of domination can be analyzed."²² Foucault long ago proposed this alternative to a description of power relationships in terms of sovereignty that challenges the premise of the rhetoric of a body politic, but this framing continues to be marginal. Even in academic circles, there is a refusal to analyze sovereignty and security as objects of research, and a continuing insistence that they can be used as if they were tools for understanding the relationship between state and society.²³

Sovereignty and security cannot be conceived merely as analytical tools of social reality; they must be seen as categories demanding genealogical analysis and linked to a particular way of governing—that of the so-called Westphalian state and its modern (Hegelian or Weberian) variations. The contemporary revival of sovereignty in political debate is thus to be understood as the deployment of a narrative, with the specific purpose of playing with positions of symbolic authority so as to force social practices to bend in a required way. Sovereignty implies a recognition of these positions; but when they are contested, the authority effect cannot survive for long. The authority effect does not assert itself, but is established intersubjectively. The same goes for the argument about security. Practices of security are not given by nature but are the outcome of political acts by politicians and specialists on threat management.

Security and Immigration: Seeing Like a Politician

The framing of the state as a body endangered by migrants is a political narrative activated for the purpose of political games in ways that permit each politician to distance himself or herself from other politicians, but within the same rules of the game. It is a social construction useful for the politicization of migration. Murray Edelman has explained how the social construct of the political spectacle works.²⁴ He has demonstrated how the construction of situations as problems is useful for politicians: the politicians can

manage them in order to justify their own authority. It enables them, for example, to negate other problems or to transform structural difficulties into easy targets. All these elements and practices are important to explain the securitization of immigrants. Michael Rogin—to cite one example—has developed the idea that in various countries, and especially in the United States, political rhetoric works as a political demonology through which politicians construct a figure of the enemy to generate a countersubversive discourse and a law-and-order program.²⁵

Neither Edelman nor Rogin adequately examines a further dynamic, one that Paul Veyne has developed in another context—a dynamic arising from the ways in which politicians believe in their own myths, even if they consciously and cynically activate them themselves. They are not mystifiers and jokers. Despite the differences expressed in and generated by political struggles, national traditions, professional interests, and the cynicisms apparent in the leadership of police or defense ministries, politicians live in the myths about polity, sovereignty, and state. They participate in this illusion of the political field. These myths structure their space, their way of thinking and acting concerning a “political problem,” and explain to some degree the homogeneity of their reaction to the “immigration problem” in the diversity of Western states.

This does not mean that politicians necessarily *believe* in the myths they disseminate regarding immigrants, or Islamists, or border transgression: they know the limits of their “fable” as well as the Greeks knew that their gods were part of the fairy tale.²⁶ Nonetheless, they cannot call into question those myths about state, about the integrity of the people, because the myths are the way they frame their everyday explanation of the political and social world and the way they see their own struggles and values. Even the most cynical among them do not have another framework in which to speak about the state and security. This is why the metaphor of the penetration of something foreign into a body is so powerful, even if national trajectories modify the framing of this use so that, for example, the arrival of migrants is expressed as a tidal wave (as in Britain), a hole in the Dutch dikes, or a barbarian invasion (as in France).²⁷

These figures of discourse concerning immigration as a “penetration” are created by the professionals of politics and based on a central presupposition made by politicians about their own capacity of governance in relation to the state: the presupposition that it is possible to control the flow of individuals at the borders of the state.²⁸ It assumes that professional politicians have a power that they do not want to lose concerning their right to accept or to

refuse the everyday movement of people from other countries. This assumption is now even more important for them given that they know they have less and less importance in decision making concerning money and credit.²⁹ It implies, in mind of the politician, the possibility of managing in practice, through law and its implementation, the freedom of circulation of individuals over whom the politicians consider they have a right of control if necessary.³⁰ Consequently, when these discourses and myths of the professionals of politics are confronted with the social practices of transborder activities, and the impossibility of managing millions of decisions taken by individuals, they conflict with the security professionals who are in charge of effectively controlling the borders—who yet know that, practically speaking, they cannot seal the frontiers.

This “will to mastery” on the part of the politicians has only one effect, but an important one. They change the status of persons by opening or restricting the conditions of travel and stay (at the national—or, in the contemporary European context, Schengen—borders), declaring legal or illegal the arrival and the stay on the country, but they know that a person who wants to enter will succeed anyway. Thus, in an illegal situation, the immigrant becomes, for the politician (and particularly for the local politicians, the mayors, who have to live a face-to-face relationship with the migrants whom they wanted to reject) the personal enemy. Politicians see themselves as insulted by the incapacity to enforce the integrity of the national body they represent. The “migrant” is seen as both a public enemy breaking the law and a private enemy mocking the will of the politician.

Nevertheless, even if the political professionals of those countries where migration is problematized as a political issue are frustrated by the confrontation between their self-images and their effective power in relation to social practices, it is no mean power that they have—to be able to define and categorize who is a migrant and what a migrant is. Their symbolic power is not at all an absence of power.³¹ The political game in each country delineates the figure of the migrant by inverting the image of the good citizen. In France, laïcité and centralization create the migrant image as that of a religious fanatic—a member of a community committed to destroying the principles of republicanism. In Germany, social control and partnership create the migrant as a revolutionary and a deviant. In the United Kingdom, traditional and community rules construct the migrant as a rioter with no respect for everyday rules and decent social behavior.

The incarnation of the figure may change, but the matrix grows stronger. In the mid-1920s, in France, the migrants were Polish and

Italians, while now they are primarily Algerians or their children born in France. *Migrant*, as a term, is the way to designate someone as a threat to the core values of a country, a state, and has nothing to do with the legal terminology of foreigners. The word *immigrant* is a shibboleth.³² Here lies an apparent paradox: if each national image of migration is different, how can security services work together, even at the European level. It is there that the plasticity of the terminology is so important. If the French want to use the word *Algerian* to designate their unnamed enemy, they will have difficulties with the United Kingdom because of the difference in policies concerning Islam. Similarly, if Germany speaks of Kurdish people as terrorists in front of French representatives, they may be challenged. Yet if each security service uses the word *immigrant* as a sign of danger, a consensus is possible—because such a word can designate a foreigner as an Algerian (a member of an ethnic minority that may already have citizenship) or as other kinds of foreigner. Each country can then sell its fear to the other country (hence, Algerians come under surveillance in Britain and Germany, and Kurds in France and Britain) in what amounts to a stock exchange of security, which is exactly the role of Europol in competition with Interpol and now some confidential circles of NATO.

The political work of the political professionals, then, is at the heart of the relation between *security* and *migration*. Neither of those two words are natural; neither describes “phenomena.” They do not stem from societal problems coming up toward the state via politicians. The relation between security and migration is fully and immediately political. The wording is never innocent. Both migration and security are contested concepts,³³ and they are used to mobilize political responses, not to explain anything. Immigration is now problematized in Western countries in a way that is very different from the distinction between citizen and foreigner. It is not a legal status that is under discussion but a social image, concerning, to quote Erickson, the “social distribution of bad.”

Migration is seen as a political problem because it enters into the political arena in a way that contests the premises of polity and state. Immigration is always seen as problematic, a problem that cannot be solved by law making. For some, it is a problem that might be solved through compromise and a clear view of national interests in which migrants could be an asset for the “receiving country.” For others, coming from the particular point of view of the security professionals, especially the intelligence service and the military, migrants are not a political dilemma but a national-security problem.³⁴ From this perspective, migrants were a problem in the past and they continue to be an insidious danger: the term

immigrant is politically meaningful only in a discourse of “struggle against illegal immigrants,” or in a discourse of “regulation,” but in any case in a rhetoric of cultural nationalism creating citizenship by difference with these outsiders inside the state.³⁵

Often, the discourses “against” securitization (such as speaking of Fortress Europe or criticizing the immigration/invasion metaphors) themselves use the basic presuppositions of the discourses they criticize (sovereignty, state, body politic). They contest the content but rarely the formulation of questions—and almost never on the basis of an analysis of discursive formation rules, even though it is there that the security process draws part of its symbolic strength.³⁶

The Europeanization of politics has created new fora in which different politicians (whether from Right or Left) map out a program on “law-and-order reestablishment” on behalf of the control of migratory flows (in order either to exclude or for better integration) but to safeguard their idea of their own power. These politicians always ask (with some success at the electoral level) for more controls, more monitoring, more private participation from business and citizens in order to consolidate a security threatened at the borders and at home. They mobilize security agencies of ever greater scope, call for help from citizens, and build a fantasy figure of an internal-security state (participative through vigilantism, police-made, with a proactive surveillance dimension, and punitive with its penal sprawl) whose monitoring powers have never been so mighty since the state was declared to be weakening.³⁷ And yet this is a state that they are completely unable to implement in the program they propose.³⁸

Security is here considered by the more traditional groups as the peak of a political problem where “exceptional measures,” “measures beyond law,” need to be taken. Thus the security process itself is the result of mobilization of the work of political discourses and of practices of security agencies based on the argument of danger and emergency. Many studies of security forget this primary work of political mobilization leading to securitization. They reproduce at the analytical level the discourses of the “hard-liners” or security professionals.³⁹ They analyze security as being a different realm from politics, or as being “a particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues.”⁴⁰ They consider that security is like a “sphere” placed under the responsibility of the army and other experts on security, a sphere that is the mirror of existential threats concerning survival but that could come eventually from separate sectors.⁴¹ By so doing, they validate the view of the security professionals that security is an “explanation” of the security process and not a discourse to be challenged.

By neglecting this, the critical vision of security developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde introduces into the academic field the military discourses on societal or internal security. They repeat the discourses of a part of the military working on low-intensity conflict—discourses that, after the end of the Cold War, seek to explain that immigration is an existential threat to national identity, even if migrants do not directly threaten the state. They accept the “truth” about what security is not in the way they agree with the military (Wæver in particular is critical of the existential character of the threat), but do so by accepting the framing of a different domain of security beyond the political—one linked with emergency and exception.⁴² In doing so, they agree with the idea of an “exceptionalization,” or a “beyond the law” politics, and come back to “cynicism and realism,” forgetting “democracy.” Sharing the *illusio* of the field they analyze, they do not really understand the “field effect” of the struggle between the managers of unease, imposing, despite their resistance, the vision of the professionals as the “truth,” and their coercive means as “solutions.”

Some of the actors in the academic field and the security professionals, then, participate in an active strategy of legitimization of their role concerning migration through this political game of the integrity of the body of people, society and state.⁴³ They refuse the heterogeneity of life and always try to reduce it to homogeneity and hierarchy between different categories.⁴⁴

The distinction between state and societal security is not a useful analytical tool. It reproduces the discourses in the field of the security professionals and their struggle to establish a hierarchy of dangers that legitimizes their struggle for resources. Securitization is not usefully characterized as a discursive practice creating “exceptionalization,” even though it may find its origins in this practice. Authors like Buzan have little sense of the routines, the day-to-day practices, of the bureaucracies that are necessary to understand how discourses work in practice. Securitization works through everyday technologies, through the effects of power that are continuous rather than exceptional, through political struggles, and especially through institutional competition within the professional security field in which the most trivial interests are at stake.⁴⁵

Securitization of immigration is the result and not the cause of the development of technologies of control and surveillance. It is linked to computerization, risk profiling, visa policy, the remote control of borders, the creation of international or nonterritorial zones in airports, and so on.⁴⁶ The analysis of the securitization of a referent object within a field or a sector (environmental, economic, or societal) is interesting not simply as a speech act but when speech acts are correlated with the structural positions of the

speaker.⁴⁷ In this perspective, securitization results from power positions, not from individuals creating new frames, new roles for differences and repetitions in different contexts;⁴⁸ it results from struggles inside institutions and between institutions for what is to count as the legitimate truth. To focus only on the role of political discourse in the securitization process is to underestimate the role of the bureaucratic professionalization of the management of unease.

Security and Immigration: Seeing Like a Professional Manager of Unease

The dialectical relationship between political professionals and the professional managers of unease implies that the institutions working on unease not only respond to threat but also determine what is and what is not a threat or a risk. They do that as “professionals.” Their agents are invested with the office of defining and prioritizing threats. They classify events according to their categories. While car accidents are currently classified as a misfortune rather than a threat to be fought, some subjects are constructed by the security professionals as threats or risks that they have to control. Of course, some “amateurs” of the security process (associations, churches, parties not integrated in the decision-making process, ad hoc spokesmen of social movements) can intervene in this game of security and insecurity, challenging the framing of migrant or asylum seekers as a risk, but professionals have the advantage of exercising authority.⁴⁹ They are invested with the institutional knowledge about threats and with a range of technologies suitable for responding to these threats. They benefit from the belief that they know what “we” (nonprofessionals, amateurs) do not know and that they have specific modes of action of a technical nature that we are not supposed to know about.

Consequently, one of the most significant characteristics of the field effect is the lack of precision required for threats identified by the professionals who know some “secrets.” Amateurs always need to “prove” their claims, whereas professionals, whether public or private, international, national, or local, corporate or public, can evoke without demonstrating. They often generalize from only one case, thereby encouraging people to believe that a threat is more widespread than they suspect. This ethos of a shared knowledge between the professionals, a knowledge beyond the grasp of people who do not have the know-how about risk assessment and proactivity, is also an ethos of secrecy and confidentiality. It creates a community of mutual recognition and governs a logic of implicit

acceptance of claims made by other professionals, not only with respect to the substance of these claims but also to the forms and technologies of knowledge acquisition. The technology (such as the satellite information provided by Echelon or the databanks maintained by Europol and Interpol) provides the guarantee of truth to the data they store. The ethos thereby generated implies specific modes of trust and mistrust. The professional "threat-management universe" thereby becomes less like the use of force against an individual and more and more like a bank as it manages credit through customer profiling.⁵⁰

The notion of *habitus* is very suggestive in this context. It helps to make sense of this way of anticipating time through morphing technologies as a way of anticipating the movement of targeted groups in space, as well as the evolution of their behavior, together with the possibility of managing a "stock exchange" of fears at the transnational level while maintaining secrecy from outsiders. This *habitus* brings together all the members of services as diverse as customs, police, intelligence services, bankers engaged in risk assessment, and suppliers of new technologies of surveillance. They share a specific kind of the "sense of the game." They have an *illusio* in common. They believe and act/react in a similar way even if they are always in competition. The security professionals have all become managers of unease. They have created considerable autonomy for their own field—the management of fear. They have succeeded in creating "security" as their object (rather than the object of national politicians). They have created security as the "legitimate" object of their discourses by investing manpower, time, statistical apparatus, and other routines that give shape to political labels.

Moreover, this field of the security professionals is increasingly organized transnationally. It links different bureaucracies by specifying specific threats or risks that can be managed together: immigration to regulate, an environment to protect, a terrorism to fight, and in the end a population worried by the encircling barbarians and the idea of the decline of civilization.⁵¹ This internationalization is especially important for the European Union, where the professional managers of unease have created their own fora and networks, sometimes against their national politicians; in some domains, however, these networks also have a transatlantic dimension.

Securitization, then, is generated through a confrontation between the strategies of political actors (or of actors having access to the political stage through the media), in the national political field, the security professionals at the transnational level (public and private bureaucracies managing the fear), and the global social transformations affecting the possibilities of reshaping political

boundaries (by legitimizing, or not, the transformation of technologies of control and surveillance). The security process is thus the result of a field effect in which no actor can be the master of the game but in which everyone's knowledge and technological resources produce a hierarchy of threats. The security process involves the imposition of a claim about security understood as a "truth" of institutions and "independent experts," relayed and supported by the practical know-how of various security agencies (be they public or private) and by prevailing discourse in the media.⁵² Securitization is then the conversion operator by which the struggle of political discourses (within the political field, which adds or subtracts value) is validated as a truth process by professionals of threat management, according to the violent transformations they observe and their interests as institutions.

Contrary to so many explanations concerning securitization of migration, immigration does not bluntly become a security problem with the appearance of, for example, the economic crisis in 1974 or because of the end of bipolarity; rather, it becomes a security issue when it is presented as such by some professionals of threat management in their struggle to maintain their position and when particular forms of institutional knowledge (military, police, intelligence services) converge in order to give "one" meaning to the migration referent in structuring a network of meanings with security concerns, allowing each bureaucracy to sell to the others its own fears and to try to prioritize this fear upon the others. In other words, *immigration* appears as a catchword, a shibboleth, permitting the convergence on a focal point of institutional statements regarding security norms (at the internal and external level) and fears. Immigration is then important for the continuum of security threats because it determines a concentration stirring up competition and justifying the convergence of missions among the police, the army, the custom officers, and intelligence officers in their struggle against a wide range of "new threats" that could all be linked to immigrants.⁵³

The present period is interesting in this sense. Inside and outside no longer have clear meanings for the professionals of threat management. A Möbius ribbon has replaced the traditional certainty of boundaries.⁵⁴ It destabilizes the figures of threats as well as the borders of activities between the institutions. During the Cold War, the military threat was identified with the Soviet Union and the police threat with serious crime. Movements of people, which was an issue in the 1920s, did not seem to be problematic during the bipolar period. Ideology and the circulation of people

were not correlated, except in discourses about the fifth column of Communists infiltrating Western governments. Within Europe, the creation of the European Union, the implementation of the Schengen agreement, and the delocation of control from state borders changed the situation. After the end of bipolarity, because of the crisis for the military world, the idea of the enemy continued to evolve. Military organizations needed other enemies than the Soviet Union. At the same moment, some policemen invented at the EU level the notion of internal security so as to promote collaboration between police organizations and to include the surveillance of people crossing borders within the scope of policing against crime. Some military people, using their technologies for other purposes, invented a Southern threat against the West in order to include in their task the surveillance of people from abroad, together with their children if they live together in specific areas.⁵⁵

As Pierre Bourdieu has shown, it is when beliefs and norms are transformed because of the inner struggles inside a field, and when creativity is important—even if creativity is simply a regression toward an established *habitus* and a rewriting of familiar stories using old grammars⁵⁶—that it is possible to understand the autonomization of a field as such. This analysis of security shows that the merging of internal and external security has created the condition of possibility whereby the migrant is, par excellence, the object of securitization because it comes from both sides. The “security field” where policemen and gendarmes now meet secret service and military people and structure a new and wider conception of security is created by the focal point of the immigrant as a threat internally and externally. It is not that the space of the inside and the outside is changing, or that international security is extending inside through a “societal” sector; it is that they are now intertwined by the convergence toward the same figure of risk and of unease management, the immigrant.

But what is an immigrant for the professionals of security? If migration as a movement of people or as a category consisting of foreigners who want to stay in the country of arrival has an academic significance, it is not one given by the political discourses over immigration. For the managers of unease, immigration is immediately seen as a useful target for the use and experimentation of their technologies, and only secondarily as an aggression toward a boundary they need to protect (a polity, a group, a supposed identity). And here, it has no sense to delineate one figure of the immigrant as a specific phenomenon giving existence to the situational fantasies of the different actors. It depends on the creativity

of different fearmongers and the links they have among them. Experts from the military insist on the existence of rogue states, failed states, and the link between diasporas and their countries of origin. Intelligence services suspect that terrorism from abroad is supported by immigrants. Police explain the rise in crime by the activities of immigrants and their children who are not well socialized in the host country. Journalists evoke the feeling of insecurity among “autochthonous people.” Economists assess the danger for the welfare state of a new burden. Health-care specialists accuse immigrants of being a threat because they import with them old and new viruses. Academics intertwine these different fears in a tapestry of “cultural danger,” even if they cannot define precisely in their examples why the category of migrant varies so much from one fear to another one.

At the heart of a “scientific discourse of migration” lies a discourse on immigration that spreads migration as a danger and threat. And the more the threats are ill-defined, considered as invisible and diffuse, the more they appear to be “coming from nowhere” and the more they catalyze various fears and generate misgivings (about, for example, transnational organized crime, a global Mafia, and illegal immigration) that justify the vigilance of institutions. In this context, it is particularly meaningful that the word *immigration* covers heterogeneous situations—such as short-stay foreigners and long-stay foreigners as well as national citizens born to foreign parents. Because *immigration* is a catchword, it includes several aspects of “threat” that are at once heterogeneous but designated by the same word.⁵⁷ The context is thus important. In other configurations, circulation of people is accepted as a fact of life. In some Western countries, to consider a young national citizen as an immigrant because his parents were born abroad (especially if this was Algeria) as happens all too frequently in France is considered to be “outrageous.” But in a context of moral panic, with a backlash of the penal state against the welfare state and the development of narratives about zero-tolerance narratives, it is considered as normal and self-evident because divergences from normal behavior are understood by professionals as an attack against whatever it is that defines a polity as a political community.

Trapped by these norms, migration is then defined in such a way that heterogeneous elements (like the circulation of movement or life in poor areas of cities) are recontextualized as a matter of immigration. The securitization of migration is then a process that creates continuous unease and uncertainty, focusing general fears and the “social distribution of bad” on the specific category of the immigrant.⁵⁸

Security and Migration: Techniques for the Management of Unease

The programmatic rationale of unease, to use the distinction drawn by Ewald between programmatic and diagrammatic rationalities, structures the discursive formation concerning migration. Yet the program is not the diagram. The diagram works through institutions, through the panopticon of modern societies and their resistances. But it is, first, important to analyze the program, the rationale linking securitization and liberalism. For these are not opposites, as one is encouraged to believe, but the same process. The securitization program integrates the social construction of threats and various misgivings under the designation of problems concerning state, borders, cities, democracy, and citizenship as if they were the consequences of immigration.⁵⁹ The internal debates within this program between securitarian discourses (about blockades, expulsions, deterrence, and surveillance) and humanitarian discourses (about the necessity for a welfare state, low birthrates, and human rights for asylum seekers) hide these general conditions of securitization. Indeed, the second type of discourse—the humanitarian—is itself a by-product of the securitization process.

For example, discourses concerning the human rights of asylum seekers are de facto part of a securitization process if they play the game of differentiating between genuine asylum seekers and illegal migrants, helping the first by condemning the second and justifying border controls.⁶⁰ It is within this rationality of program (for which the term *moral panic* has been used, though only to look at its repressive side) that the word *immigration* becomes a term for catalyzing fears or misgivings about the economic, social, and political development of Western countries. It becomes a fixer of frights and confusions about national cultural identities as well as of weaknesses of solidarity mechanisms. It is the terminology within which is produced an articulation, or even a fusion, permitting a highly generalized discourse about global security rather than an urgent analysis of highly diversified processes like globalization, cities, unemployment, and birthrates.⁶¹ It is within this generalized “discursive formation” that unemployment is reduced to a simple causality: a surplus of immigrants taking jobs from native populations, requiring, in turn, the invention of binary categories of natives and immigrants.⁶² It is also within this formation that the circulation of individuals (which includes tourism, the pleasure of traveling, the possibility to do so, and even a sense of a citizenship beyond the national within the European Union) is reduced to problems involving the circulation of third-country nationals, and

to risks of terrorism, drug trafficking, or organized crime, risks expected of third-country nationals.⁶³

The techniques for managing fear and the social distribution of “bad” mobilize the term *immigrant* for every weakness of the political public policies. It is through this label of immigrant, for example, that religious traditions and their place in secular modernity are reduced to the issue of an emergence of an intolerant and radical Islam, connecting some authoritarian regimes to individuals living in the European territory.⁶⁴ It is also there, in this “site,” that the crucial issue of geographical segregation appears: cities are linked to capitalist structures and to real-estate speculation as well as to solidarity conceptions regarding public transportation, urban safety, environment, and welfare in general. This issue is tied to others, like “inner-cities and communitarianism” or “suburban unrest,” which are assimilated very rapidly to the issue of “second-generation youth.”⁶⁵ The evocative power of naming the immigrant figure is a consequence of the fact that many unresolved structural questions converge here in a space lacking political solutions (unemployment, urbanism, demography, the North/South gap, and so on). Paradoxically, it is also a consequence of the fuzziness of the definition of collective political identities in Europe that leads to the definition of Europeans as a homogeneous body only in relation to “third-country” nationals or “migrants” and allows Europeans to forget that they, too, are migrants.

So who, now, remembers the fears of the United Kingdom or France ten years ago concerning the pressure of Greek migrants and the risk they brought? The creation of the distinction between EU and non-EU citizens has changed the relation to identity by creating an association of immigrant only with third-country nationals or “colored people.” *Immigrant* designates the other by the process of an identity border of a “between-us.”⁶⁶ He or she is the insider that gives form to a European governmentality beyond the state. Does the fuzziness surrounding belonging and the shifting political membership of Europe necessarily require the fuzzy figure of the immigrant? Borders of statehood are at stake and are liable to a re-configuration according to these relations.⁶⁷ However, the complexity of the social and the game of limits is forgotten or denied by discourses on securitization favoring the designation of a culprit whose fuzziness permits instrumentalization on an ad hoc basis.

Fears, unrest, misgivings originating in those shortcomings of polity, local and national as well as European, toward fulfillment of its duties, are used, in reverse, in order to legitimate the polity again by naming an adversary, and even an internal enemy. However, this very polity is an extreme polity, a degenerated Schmittian

vision in which polity is the continuation of war by other means and in which discourses are unfurled claiming that “society must be defended”—one that Michel Foucault has demonstrated in the case of racism. It is a “war-based polity,” a condition of generalized confrontation that is no longer able to distinguish between private and public enemies. Because it is based on claims about the need for survival at any price, on a real and permanent struggle anchored in an eschatology of the worst kind, it generates a distress policy, a misgiving policy, that transforms any change and any risk into an intentional threat or enemy. Here is the main technique of securitization, to transform structural difficulties and transformations into elements permitting specific groups to be blamed, even before they have done anything, simply by categorizing them, anticipating profiles of risk from previous trends, and projecting them by generalization upon the potential behavior of each individual pertaining to the risk category.

This misgiving-based security process becomes a political technology of ruling that concentrates fears on an adversary who is always opaque and difficult to catch, while, at the same time, pursuing a policy of forgetting the (often unintentional) consequences of structural public policies implemented twenty or thirty years ago. This security process based on misgiving is added to disciplinary technologies and strengthens the legitimacy of a permanent surveillance supposedly intended only for “others,” for bad citizens. Their social invisibility induces in some cases (when action signs must be shown) a “visibility” strategy through forms of xenophobia in order to invent criteria (skin color, religious practices, culinary practices) by which to differentiate between Them and Us. Giving a face to crime is therefore giving the migrant a face.

This technology of power plays with the innermost devices of misgiving and uncertainty that are implanted in today’s risk society in order to strengthen them, whether at the level of nations, intermediary collective groups, or individuals. This technology of power unifies internal and external, individual and collective security, and tries to recapitalize trust in the state not by reassuring but by worrying individuals about what is happening both at the external and internal levels. The resulting picture of the world is one of chaos and urban insecurity.

As a result of this hypothesis concerning immigration, I would suggest, in an extension of Michel Foucault’s work, that the securitization of immigration, the setting of some ever more restrictive norms, the rejection and detention practices at borders, the strengthening of an “internal security state” to the detriment of the welfare state, constitute signs of a more general transformation in which a

form of governmentality based on misgiving and unrest is substituted for a reassuring and protective pastoral power.⁶⁸ The form of governmentality of postmodern societies is not a panopticon in which global surveillance is placed upon the shoulders of everybody, but a form of ban-opticon in which the technologies of surveillance sort out who needs to be under surveillance and who is free of surveillance, because of his profile.⁶⁹ This form of pre- and post-Hobbesian state seems, most emphatically, to renounce notions of a social contract and to transform misgiving into a mode of ruling. The emphasis is no longer on curing or promoting individual development but on playing with fears by designating potentially dangerous minorities. Neither reducible to sovereignty and punishment nor to biopolity and power over life, this political technology is based on proactive, anticipative, and morphing techniques and aims at mastering a chaotic future with minimalist management focusing only on risky groups (so-identified) or groups at risk.⁷⁰

This does not mean that this program of the ban-opticon (which is chiefly but not only the program of dominant actors, who are struggling among themselves in order to define threats and measures to counter them) can be implemented without arousing local resistances (either collective or individual). There is a substantial distance between the myth of a power that saturates the social and controls society completely and the multiple and complex practices of “power effects.” These power effects are always more unsteady and reversible than people believe because of the “microphysics” of struggles between the dominants, the experts, and so on. The program of a secure immigration where the objective of presenting a determination to achieve real control can itself generate unprecedented resistances crossing boundaries (in terms of class or nation) among the “subordinates”—as has been demonstrated by the struggle of undocumented migrants in France (*les sans papiers*) and by the struggles against deportation in international zones of airports. These zones that the state refuses to recognize as parts of its territory but wants to maintain within its sovereignty are now a major point of tension between globalization and the territorialized devices of control. The will to maintain sovereignty can work only through transnational technologies that destroy a little bit more of this vision of polity as a body. The consequences exceed “local” struggles and include the creation of a networking of social resistances at the global level.

Nonetheless, while modifying the norms and practical conditions of democracy, this governmentality based on misgivings has concentrated the means to conduct other people’s conduct within the hands of the very individuals who have an administrative-management

knowledge of threats and risks. This governmentality has captured for its quasi-exclusive benefit the disciplinary and surveillance techniques that allow it to “lead behavior” and that modify the structure of states themselves. This governmentality has discarded some actors, like parliaments, which, for a long time, have benefited from this concentration. It modifies old liberal techniques of governing and modifies the discourse on checks and balances. Nowadays, it is governments and their bureaucracies (and not the territorial form of states) that strengthen their control of society and that extend further than before, even to the subcontracting of sovereign activities to the private sector (as, for example, with identity checking in semipublic places or in luggage and other checks at borders).

In Europe, this governmentality unfolds at the national as well as the European level, and it even has a transatlantic level. It strengthens international collaboration between the different bureaucracies, maintaining a rhetoric about the danger in any weakening of territorial and sovereign technologies while being less interested in practice in the control of territory than in the control of population.⁷¹ It transnationalizes itself in a “beyond” the borders, and it structures relationship frameworks between administrations, between the “executive powers” of each country. It strengthens security services to the detriment of services managing social issues by transforming these very services into security auxiliaries. This cannot be done without new competitors, and the struggle between governmental administrative knowledge holders and international organizations is indeed becoming stronger, as is shown by muffled fights between the European Commission and the governments in the Council of the Union. But it is always administrative power that wins and procedures of public deliberation that are defeated.⁷²

Even when NGOs intervene, they can do so only by turning professional, by producing this kind of knowledge. The transnational mobilization of administrative knowledge thus proceeds faster than mobilizations coming from alternative sources, such as parliaments or associations. In this respect, it is particularly difficult to talk about “governance without government,”⁷³ as some internationalists do. Governance is actually a stretching of government practices and of administrative knowledge beyond the “public.” It must be analyzed as a mechanism of domination and not as a new word enabling theses on polyarchy to be revived. This is what induces me to avoid the word *governance* and prefer *governmentality*—meaning the art of governing, as a strategy of action or conduct in relations.

Governmentality through misgivings, be it national or transnational at the European level, modifies the internal balances between security and freedom and widens the area of controls. Consequently, forms of domination change, but not the dominating actors, even if (on the margins) the global reconfiguration of a transnational field of security disadvantages some agencies (strategists, conventional soldiers) and some places (parliaments) and promotes others (places of lobbying, antiterrorist police agencies, intelligence services, customs, and gendarmeries). As Hamit Bozarslan has shown, it can happen that executives perpetuate themselves through the destruction of state forms (rule of law) that also favor some resistances (legal and international norms, and resort to them).⁷⁴ Defending the judicial against the administrative (i.e., places of deliberation against speed or “dromocracy,” or procedures of trust against procedures of systematic suspicion) is not insignificant.⁷⁵ Inventing different emancipation norms is also crucial, as commentators like Ken Booth and R. B. J. Walker have emphasized in different ways.⁷⁶ Coproduction of security, necessary in the struggle against crime, should be disconnected from migratory issues and should be accompanied by a coproduction of freedoms and guarantees in order that the weak and the newcomers on a territory are not the quasi-exclusive targets of a policy against delinquency. Security should thus have another meaning independent from interest of the politicians and professionals of unease. Scholars cannot present themselves as spectators. Their analyses, including the most critical, are used by some actors of the social and political interplay. They participate, *volens, nolens*, in the production of the history of the securitization of immigration, when they are not describing the modification of agencies practices. A withdrawal into pure theory is not possible, but at the same moment, academics are not key actors in the process of (de)securitization.

In conclusion, the structure of political and bureaucratic interplay must be analyzed on a dialectical basis in order to understand better the “political spectacle” that is taking place through the securitization of immigration.⁷⁷ Multiple discursive practices must be understood, as well as the heterogeneity of the nondiscursive practices as part of the same “dispositif” (legal devices, political rhetoric, police practices, surveillance technologies, discourses on human rights, resistances of actors, and so on) in order to understand the articulation of knowledge and power relations.⁷⁸ The discursive transversality of the immigrant figure needs to be plotted, through all the twists, turns, and meanings that link this figure with different structural problems and the figure of the sovereign state itself.

The reasons for a discourse on “regulation” and the shift from a protective, enabling discourse to one about a rise of insecurity that is intended to be disturbing and worrying needs research along the lines of Foucault and Ericson, Bourdieu and Wacquant. This is possible only through a detailed analysis of the positions of authority of those who promote a threat definition in each bureaucracy, whether public or private. The consequences of the existence beyond the national of such a transversal and transnational field of unease management linking the practices and the knowledge of the diverse agencies in Europe also needs to be analyzed. And one should ask what this governmentality is establishing, and how it historically articulates itself with the figure of the state. This analysis, based on sociological constructivism, requires a reflection about discursive interaction—about the positions of authority of the enunciators, the spokespersons, of the institutions. It must analyze the internal logic of the field of professionals in the management of unease—the logic that structures the speakable and the unspeakable concerning immigration and the practices of security agencies. To paraphrase Alexander Wendt, “security is what the professionals of unease management make of it.”⁷⁹

Notes

1. This is now well known from more than ten years in political sociology; see Didier Bigo, *L'Europe des polices, et de la sécurité intérieure* (Bruxelles: Complexe, 1992); Malcolm Anderson and Monica Den Boer, *Policing across National Boundaries* (London: Pinter, 1994); Malcolm Anderson, Monica Den Boer, Peter Cullen, R. C. Gilmore, and Neil Walker, *Policing the European Union* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996); Bigo Didier, *Polices en réseaux: l'expérience européenne* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1996); Salvatore Palidda, *Polizia post moderna* (Roma: Feltrinelli, 1999); Richard Ericson, *Policing the Risk Society* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1999). But it seems that it is still a novelty for IR theory.

2. Zygmunt Bauman, *Le coût humain de la mondialisation* (Paris: Hachette, 1999).

3. And it could explain why so many academics love this explanation. On the *illusio* of the academics concerning their own role, see Pierre Bourdieu, *Homo academicus* (Paris: Minuit, 1984).

4. Barry Buzan et al., *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993) and the many articles quoting the “Copenhagen school of IR.”

5. See Malcolm Anderson, *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996); Anderson and Den Boer, note 1, *Policing across National Boundaries*; Paul Ganster et al., *Borders and Border Regions in Europe and North America* (San Diego: Institute for Regional Studies of the Californias, 1997); Didier Bigo, “Le champ européen des professionnels de la sécurité et l'État,” paper presented at the IPSA Quebec 2001

panel "Transnationalization of Bureaucracies and Emergence of a Corporate World: The End of the Weberian State?"; Elspeth Guild, "Transnationalization of Movement of Persons and Labour Forces: The Work Permit Delivery and the Changing Relations between Governments and Companies," Quebec IPSA panel, 2001, discussing critically the Susan Strange thesis that states nevertheless manage security even if they have lost control over credit, finance, production, and even knowledge.

6. For Bourdieu's account of *habitus*, see Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*, trans. Matthew Adamson (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford UP, 1990). On the notion of the field of security professionals, see the article by Didier Bigo in James Sheptycki, ed., *Issues in Transnational Policing* (London: Routledge, 2000); Thomas Mathiesen, "Globalization of Surveillance," Statewatch Report, 2000.

7. Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (London: Sage, 1992); Beck, "World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society?" *Theory, Culture, and Society* 13, no. 4 (1996): 1–32; Zygmunt Bauman, "Survival as a Social Construct," *Theory, Culture, and Society* 9, no. 1 (1992): 1–36; Pierre Bourdieu, ed., *La misère du monde* (Paris: Seuil, 1993); Didier Bigo, "Sécurité et immigration, vers une gouvernementalité par l'inquiétude?" *Cultures & Conflits*, nos. 31, 32 (fall/winter 1998), trans. in Italian, 1999, "Sicurezza e immigrazione Il governo della paura," pp. 213–231, in *I confini della globalizzazione*, ed. Sandro Mezzadra and Agostino Petrillo; Ericson, note 1; Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans, course on "(In)security, Migration, and the Enemy Within," MS, University of Wales, Aberyswith, June 2000.

8. Concerning *unease*, the French terminology, *inquiétude, malaise*, has connotations not found in English. It especially goes beyond psychological and individualistic levels. As to *governmentality*, in this article it is understood according to Foucault's definition: all the practices by which it is possible to constitute, to define, to organize, to instrumentalize strategies that individuals, in their constitutive freedom, could have in relations with others. I resist the term *governance*, which is always a top-down view of relations of obedience, even if it is a multilevel one.

9. An issue of *Cultures et Conflits* in 2002 will be on the theme of "fear-mongers." It will discuss the environment, sex trafficking, global organized crime, and so on, and the role of fearmongers as "experts" in our societies.

10. Jean Delumeau, *Rassurer et protéger: Le sentiment de sécurité dans l'Occident d'autrefois* (Paris: Fayard, 1989). This book is central for a genealogy of the competition between the church and the state on the management of security.

11. So, if securitization is correlated with the use of performatives, with symbolic struggles and symbolic politics, as Ole Wæver, shows, these elements are the surface of an iceberg, not the core; see Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework of Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); see also Didier Bigo, "Rise and Fall of the 'Copenhagen School'" (forthcoming).

12. Some discourses, supposed to be critical, presuppose, at the end of the reasoning, an overwhelming xenophobic public opinion that explains securitarian thesis success. They also often glorify a virtual "people" made of good citizens, including themselves, with the consequences of scorning the actual and real population in a too-well-known disjunction between them as elite and the popular masses; see Michel Wieviorka, *La*

France raciste (Paris: Seuil, 1992), and André Pierre Taguieff, ed., *Face au racisme 2: Analyses, hypothèses, perspectives* (Paris: La Découverte, 1991), pp. 167–178. Xenophobia is indeed playing a role, but explaining that xenophobia is a cause of the securitization when it is one of the results of this securitization of migration is another thing.

13. The critical discourses concerning securitarian discourses are very well known to security professionals and politicians. Those people are seldom if ever fooled by their own arguments. They use them to bring electoral benefits and to answer to their own fears concerning their role in a globalized capitalism that endangers the function of the national political class on the decision-making process. The traditional difference between Left and Right is here under pressure. Among some recent books, the one by Adrian Favell demonstrated how the securitarian discourse, in France and in Britain, has thrown border lines between right-wing and left-wing parties into confusion and how their positioning with respect to extreme parties governed ideas on crime and migrants. Analyses of racism and a “fortress Europe” have also demonstrated that such discourses are far from being unavoidable during crisis periods: Favell, *Philosophies of Integration: The Theory and Practice of Ethnic Minorities Policies in France and Britain* (IUE, 1998); Andrew Geddes, *The Politics of Immigration and Race* (Manchester: Baseline, 1996); Andrea Rea, *Immigration et Racisme en Europe*, Complexe, Avril 1998; Charlotte Lessana, “Loi Debré: La fabrique de l’immigré,” *Cultures et Conflits*, note 7; Laurent Bonelli, *La machine à punir*, L’esprit frappeur, 2000.

14. Michel Foucault, “La politique de l’oubli et du déni,” in *Dits et Ecrits*, vols. 2 and 3, 1976–1979 (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque des sciences humaines, 1994).

15. It is a quite pessimistic view of the political role of critical sociology, I know. But I prefer that position to the new-fashioned messianism of some NGOs or intellectuals claiming for transnational citizenship and confusing what they see and what they hope. The role of critical sociologists is not to invent new slogans but to challenge at the collective level the positions of the so-called experts and to reopen a way of thinking that they actively try to forget.

16. See the important research of Sayad Abdelmalek, esp. “Immigration et pensée d’Etat,” in *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* (Sept. 1999): 5–15.

17. The section heading above is in loose reference to James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (Yale UP, 1999).

18. For a Foucauldian framework, see Didier Bigo, Jean Paul Hanon, Laurent Bonelli, and Anastasia Tsoukala, *La notion de protection, de la protection du territoire à la protection des individus*, report for CPGN, 2000. For a more traditional framing, see Peter Andreas, *Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UP, 2001).

19. Pierre Bourdieu, *Raisons pratiques: Sur la théorie de l’action pratique* (Paris: Seuil, 1994); Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Cambridge: Polity, 1984).

20. John Gerard Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization* (London: Routledge, 1998); R. B. J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., *Contending Sovereignities: Redefining Political*

Community (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990); Richard Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, "Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (1990): 367–416; Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996).

21. Bertrand Badie, *La fin des territoires* (Paris: Seuil, 1996); Richard Mansbach, *The State, Conceptual Chaos, and the Future of International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989); Martin Heisler, "Now and Then, Here and There, Migration and the Transformation of Identities, Borders, and Orders," in Albert Mathias, David Jacobson, and Lapid Yosef, eds., *Identities, Borders, and Orders* (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2001).

22. Michel Foucault, *Il faut défendre la société*, course at Collège de France, 1976 (Paris: Seuil, 1996). For a practical application of this method, see "Circular, enfermer, éloigner," in *Cultures et Conflits*, note 7.

23. It confronts academics who want to be critical to a normative dilemma (as demonstrated by Jef Huysmans) that emerges when notions of security and immigration are criticized but nevertheless continue to be used as terms, thus risking contributing to the security process; see Jef Hysmans, "Migrants as a Security Problem," in Robert Miles and Dietrich Thranhardt, eds., *Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (London: Pinter, 1995); see also the Hysmans article in this issue.

24. Murray Edelman, *Pièces et règles du jeu politique* (Paris: Seuil, 1991), a translation of his *Constructing the Political Spectacle* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), with a specific and important foreword.

25. Michael P. Rogin, *Ronald Reagan, the Movie, and Other Episodes of Political Demonology* (Berkeley: U of California Press, 1998). I thank Yves Viltard for having stressed the importance of Rogin to me.

26. Paul Veyne, *Les Grecs ont-ils cru à leurs mythes? Essai sur l'imagination constituante* (Paris: Seuil, 1983).

27. Rémy Leveau, "The Green Peril," in Cyril Buffet and Béatrice Hauser, eds., *Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations* (Oxford: Berghan, 1998); see also at a more pragmatic level the manner of some elites to use Europeanization in order that some liberal measures come into force—measures supposed to be ineluctable.

28. Didier Bigo, "L'illusoire maîtrise des frontières," *Le Monde diplomatique*, Oct. 1996.

29. Susan Strange, *States and Markets*, 2d ed. (London: Pinter, 1994).

30. John Torpey, "Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate Means of 'Movement,'" *Sociological Theory* 16, no. 3 (1998).

31. Edelman, note 24.

32. See Pierre Bourdieu, *Contre feux: Propos pour servir à la résistance contre l'invasion neo-libérale* (Paris: Raison d'agir, 1998).

33. Barry Buzan explains this for security in *People, State, and Fears* (Brighton: Harvester, 1983), but he forgets to do the same for migration, which is considered as a uncontested concept. On the contrary, even the very good book by Robin Cohen explains in detail the different and heterogeneous view of migration but views security as quite unproblematic and transforms the question of migration into one of balancing inclusion and exclusion; see Cohen's introduction to Cohen and Zig Layton-Henry, *The Politics of Migration* (Northampton: Elgar, 1997).

34. Inside the field of the security professionals, competition arises between those from police and justice, who try to deal at the individual level

of each migrant, and others who want to deal in large numbers, through generalization of behaviors (ethnicity, religion, cultural factors). More on this below. See also Didier Bigo, "When Two Become One," in Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams, eds., *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security, and Community* (London: Routledge, 2000).

35. Bigo, *Polices en réseaux*, note 1.

36. For development of that subject, see Andrea Rea, *Immigration et Racisme en Europe*, Complexe, Apr. 1998; Ali Rattansi and Sallie Westwood, *Racism, Modernity, Identity on the Western Front* (Cambridge: Polity, 1994).

37. Patrick Weil, *The Transformation of Immigration Policies: Immigration Control and Nationality Laws in Europe* (IUE, 1998); Virginie Guiraudon, *Denationalizing Control* (IUE, June 1998).

38. It is by monitoring diagrams that one can understand the efficiency of the rationale of migration, not by taking the positions of those who read programs as practices. There are always inefficiencies and resistances. Power and resistance are indivisible.

On this point, it is important to discuss the stimulating theses of Tony Bunyan and Statewatch and theses from Loïc Wacquant in "De l'État social à l'État pénal," *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* (Sept. 1998). They overemphasize the power of the politicians and do not analyze the resistances of people and of some professionals of unease management who want a lighter, but more subtle and efficient, surveillance; see Didier Bigo, "Police and Pro-active Logics: How to Identify, Categorize, and Control Poverty in an Age of Freedom of Movement," paper given at the International Studies Association (ISA), Chicago, February 2001.

39. In the professional security field, one can distinguish the positions of the "heirs" (military or intelligence services that have long been at the top of the hierarchy) and the "suitors" (police with military status, customs officers, and finance brigades) that try to compete to impose their way of dealing with the threat as well as their view of the hierarchy of "most important" threats: see Bigo, note 34.

40. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, note 11, intro.

41. Buzan, note 33.

42. Some IR academics who wanted more or less to follow the path of Wæver but with less self-irony have justified the widening of military activities to other "security" areas. They have distinguished between national security and societal security as if these were two realms, justifying the extension of security to the movement of people through the discourse on migration. For them it is a way to continue the study of the security professionals at the moment they change their scope of activities and try to enlarge it, fearing the possibility that war and deterrence were not sufficiently dangerous for people to accept the budget for "protection"; see Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James, and Patrick M. Morgan, *Security Studies Today* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), and Charles-Philippe David, *La guerre et la paix: Approches contemporaines de la sécurité et de la stratégie* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, Paris, 2000).

43. To cite just some of the fearmongers, experts on (in)security writing from the beginning of the 1990s, see Richard Clutterbuck, *Terrorism, Drugs, and Crime in Europe after 1992* (London: Routledge, 1990); J. Lodge, "Internal Security and Judicial Cooperation beyond Maastricht" (Hull: University of Hull, 1992); Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorist, Target, and Tactics," *Conflict Studies*, no. 236 (Dec. 1990); R. Latter, "Crime and the European

Community," Wilton Park, November 1990; A. Jamieson, "Drug Trafficking after 1992," *Conflict Studies*, no. 250 (Apr. 1992); Horchem, "The New Mass Migrations and Internal Security," *Democracy and Security* 1 (Apr. 1995); P. Migaux, "Sécurité intérieure et menaces extérieures," *CASE*, no. 1 (May 1993): 10. Raufer, *Les superpuissances du crime* (Paris: Plon, 1993). The list continues and expands after 1995.

44. Paul Veyne, *Comment on écrit l'histoire: Essai d'épistémologie* (Paris: Seuil, 1971).

45. On the security process as a performative action, as a language action, or as a field, see Michael Williams, *Institutions of Security* (1999); see also Didier Bigo, "Internal and External Security(ies): The Möbius Ribbon," in Mathias, Jacobson, and Yosef, note 21.

46. On the role of technologies and routines, see Thomas Mathiesen, "The Globalisation of Controls," *Statewatch Bulletin* (1999); Didier Bigo, "L'illusoire maîtrise des frontières," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Oct. 1996, and the major article by Gary T. Marx, "Civil Disorders and the Agents of Social Control," in Marx, ed. *Muckraking Sociology: Research as Social Criticism* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1972).

47. Ole Wæver, *Concepts of Security* (University of Copenhagen, 1997). I owe a lot to my discussions with Ole Wæver, whose research results can also be found in Anne Marie Le Gloanec, *Entre Union et Nation, l'État en Europe*, and *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Even if I disagree with his Derridean framework, I think his own work is slightly different and more interesting than the so-called collective works of the Copenhagen school, which, in my view, is a patchwork and not at all a school of thought.

48. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Capitalisme et schizophrénie: L'anti-oedipe* (1972; Paris: Critique, 1980); also Judith Butler, "Presentation at Seminar with Pierre Bourdieu on 'The Future Role of Intellectuals,'" University of California, Berkeley, April 1996.

49. On this point, see the decisive critique of John Austin by Pierre Bourdieu, *Ce que parler veut dire: L'économie des échanges linguistiques* (Paris: Fayard, 1982); partial trans. in Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1991).

50. Local and national police organizations are increasingly subject to a split between community policing (still operating under the logic of the control of individuals and territory) and a smaller, but powerful, group of remote and computerized police. The latter are adopting the ethos of the intelligence services, branches of the military, and branches of banking institutions concerned with proactive anticipation and surveillance.

51. I understand here, with a different meaning, the topic developed by Pierre Hassner on the bourgeois/barbarian dialectic in "Par delà la guerre et la paix," *Etudes* (Sept. 1996).

52. On the problematization of the security process and the entanglement between internal and external security, see Bigo, note 34.

53. On norms and security, see Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UP, 1996).

54. Bigo, note 45.

55. See, for example, the transformation of justification of the surveillance sounding balloon created by some corporations from "Reagan's Star Wars" to the "immigrant threat at the Mexican border"; see also the evolution of the argument of some companies selling armaments in Milipol.

56. For example, the matrix of an infiltrated enemy who "informs" Huntington discourse owes a lot to a certain reading of McCarthyism.

57. Didier Bigo, "L'immigration au carrefour des sécurités," *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* 1 (1998).

58. On the scarcity and shearing of statements, see Michel Foucault, *L'archéologie du savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1969); and Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault* (Paris: Minuit, 1986).

59. See François Ewald, *Histoire de l'État Providence* (Paris: Grasset, 1996).

60. Didier Bigo, "Europe passoire, Europe forteresse, la sécurisation humanitarisation de l'immigration," op. cit.

61. For more information on notions of articulation and fusion, see Michel Wiewiorka, *Sociétés et terrorismes* (Paris: Fayard, 1988).

62. Hervé Le Bras, *Le démon des origines: Démographie et extrême-droite* (Paris: Editions de l'Aube, 1998).

63. Didier Bigo, *L'Europe des polices et de la sécurité intérieure* (Paris: Complexe, 1992).

64. Jocelyne Césari, *Faut-il avoir peur de l'Islam?* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1997).

65. Sophie Body-Gendrot, *Villes et violences: L'irruption de nouveaux acteurs* (Paris: PUF, 1995); cf. Ayse Ceyhan, "Migrants as a Threat," paper given at ISA annual meeting, Toronto, 1997, and forthcoming in V. Gray, ed., *A European Dilemma: Immigration, Citizenship, and Identity in Western Europe*.

66. See Riva Kastoriano, ed., *Quelle identité pour l'Europe: Le multiculturalisme à l'épreuve* (Paris: Presses de Sciences-Po, 1998), particularly the articles by Rémy Leveau and Riva Kastoriano.

67. John Crowley, "Where the State Actually Starts?"—paper given at the ISA annual meeting, Minneapolis, March 1998.

68. Cf. Jean Delumeau, *Rassurer et protéger: Le sentiment de sécurité dans l'Occident d'autrefois* (Paris: Fayard, 1989). In "Le sujet et le Pouvoir," Michel Foucault discusses the modern state as a form of pastoral power differing from Christianity because it secularizes salvation and gives to the police the power to take care of individuals: in Foucault, *Dits et Ecrits*, note 14, 4: 230.

69. See Bigo, "Discipline and Punish beyond the Borders: The Social Practices of Controls and Their Locus," ISA, March 2000, where I develop the differences and similarities between panopticon and ban-opticon.

70. On proactivity, see *Deviance et Société* 1 (1997).

71. Bigo, *Police en réseaux*, note 1.

72. Nonetheless, struggles for a more democratic Europeanization (with an empowered European parliament, a larger role for judges, and a desecuritization of asylum and border crossing) show that conjunctural reversals are possible (even if that was not the case with the Amsterdam Treaty despite the hopes of some people; to the contrary, in France the Weil draft bill and the Chevènement act on asylum have inflected the trend, at least symbolically).

73. K. J. Holsti, "Governance without Government: Polyarchy in Nineteenth-century European International Politics," in J. N. Rosenau, and E. O. Czempiel, eds., *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992).

74. Hamit Bozarslan, "L'État et la violence au Moyen-Orient," article to be published in *Les Annales*.

75. A forthcoming issue of *Cultures et Conflits* will be concerned with justice in networks.

76. Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 4 (1991); R. B. J. Walker, "The Subject of Security," in Keith Krauss and Michael C. Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies* (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1997), 61–82.

77. Edelman, note 24.

78. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, eds., *Michel Foucault: Un parcours philosophique, au delà de l'objectivité et de la subjectivité* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984).

79. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425.